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ILLINOIS MARKETABLE TITLE ACT
HARRY Q. ROHDE *
I. INTRODUCTION
CENTRAL TO AN UNDERSTANDING of the so-called Illinois Market-
able Title Act,' hereinafter referred to as the Act, is the
concept of a marketable title. A concise definition of a marketable
title, which can be applied to the endless variety of fact situations
which occur, has not been formulated. However, it can be
generally stated that marketable title is one so free from doubt
that a court of equity will force it upon a reluctant contract
purchaser.
2
Not infrequently, ancient records fetter marketability of
real estate. Interests adverse to the holder of record title which
have been of record for many decades may cause a buyer repre-
sented by able counsel to question the marketability of the title
offered by the seller. This problem is not unusual today3 and
will occur more frequently in the future as the size and com-
plexity of the record continues to grow.
4
The Act was intended to alleviate this problem. The express-
ed purpose of the Illinois Legislature in enacting it was to
simplify and facilitate land title transactions by allowing persons
to place greater reliance on a forty year record chain of title.
Thus the legislature intended to promote marketability by clear-
B.A., cum laude, Amherst College, 1954; LL.B. with honor, Chicago-Kent College
of Law, 1959; LL.M., The Lawyers Institute of John Marshall Law School, 1962. Member
of the Illinois Bar; Attorney, Chicago Title and Trust Co.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, §§ 12.1-.4 (1961). The Illinois Marketable Title Act should
not be confused with Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 10a (1961) which has also been characterized
as a marketable title statute. For a discussion of Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 10a (1961) see
Basye, Clearing Land Titles, § 173 at 265-69 (1953); Patton on Land Titles, § 563 at 563
(1957 ed.); and Simes and Taylor, The Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation,
330-33 (1960).
2 Basye, op. cit. supra note 1, § 4 at 6-15, § 5 at 15-20; Reeve, Defining the Undefin-
able-Marketability (1954).
3 Basye, op. cit. supra note 1, at v; Simes, A Handbook for More Efficient Convey-
ancing, 32-6 (1961); Cribbet, A New Concept of Merchantability, 43 Ill. B.J. 778, 778
(1955).
4 Basye, op. cit. supra note 1, § 171 at 259; Scurlock, Retroactive Legislation Affect-
ing Interests In Land, 80 (1953); Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3.
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ing land titles of many interests more than forty years old. Under-
lying the legislative intention to bar interests of ancient origin
was the intention to implement the public policy favoring the
free alienability of lands."
The Act is designed to accomplish this purpose by making
the marketability of title to real estate ascertainable to a greater
extent than ever before by a search of recent records. It operates
by enabling the holder of a forty year record chain of title to bar
some actions by persons whose claims adverse to his title are
more than forty years old, unless such persons have preserved
their claims by filing statutory statements of claim, or unless the
property is in the adverse possession of the claimant or some
third person. It thus permits the holder of a title meeting the
statutory requirements to disregard certain interests more than
forty years old, if the records covering the preceding forty years
do not disclose that statements of claim have been filed to
preserve such interests.
Many other states preceded Illinois in enacting such legis-
lation' and these statutes are generally described as marketable
title acts.7 Although the Illinois Act appears in the Limitation
chapter of the Illinois Revised Statutes, it is in part a recording
act because it requires that before a claimant may bring an action
5 Cribbet, supra note 3, at 778. Professor Cribbet's comments are of special interest
because he was Chairman of the Illinois State Bar Association Committee that drafted
the Act.
6 The scope of this article is limited to the so-called Illinois Marketable Title Act.
The marketable title acts in effect in other jurisdictions include: Burns Ind. Ann. Stat.
§§ 2-628 to -637 (Supp. 1960); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 614.17-,23 (1958); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§ 26.1271-.1279 (1953); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.023 (Supp. 1961); Rev. Stat. Nebr. §§ 76-288
to -298 (1958); N.D. Century Code ch. 47-19A (1960); S.D. Code ch. 51.16B (Supp. 1960);
and West's Wis. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 330.15 (1958).
For a general discussion of marketable title statutes, including comments on the
statutes now in effect, see: Basye, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 171-180, 371-374 (1953, Supp.
1960); Patton, op. cit. supra note 1, § 563; Simes, op. cit. supra note 3, at 42-48; Simes
and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3-16, 271-73, 297-361.
For a general discussion of cases decided in which marketable title statutes have been
construed see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 846 (1960). For law review articles on marketable title
legislation see Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 359-61.
The Illinois Act is substantially the Iowa type. The Iowa type, as distinguished
from the Michigan type, avoids defining marketability.
7 Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4, 295.
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on a claim more than forty years old, he must have first preserved
the claim by the recording of a statement thereof. By establishing
this requirement, the Act modifies the pre-existing recording laws
which previously preserved recorded interests that were more
than forty years old. From the standpoint of third persons dealing
with real property, it is also a recording act in that such third
persons may ignore any recorded claims over forty years old
which were not preserved by recording statements of claims within
the statutory period.
The Act may also be regarded as a statute of limitations in
form for the reason that it appears, at the very minimum, that a
plea of limitation may be asserted as a bar to certain actions for
the recovery of real estate. However, the Act appears to be much
more than a statute of limitations in that it purports to bar
claims of persons under disability, claims of the State of Illinois,
and certain contingent claims which have not yet accrued. Thus,
it may bar a future interest, even though an action could be
brought on such interest.
While the Act, by its terms, purports to bar the remedy
of a claimant not complying with the filing requirement, the
word "extinguish" appears twice in the text of the Act. And,
as a practical matter, it appears to have the effect of extinguishing
the right of a claimant as well as his remedy. In fact, it may
have this effect even though the claimant's interest is not yet
assertable by suit. It is clear, then, that the Act does much more
than operate to cure certain defects which have, arisen in the
execution of instruments in the chain of title and that, in
addition, it may have the effect of cutting off many heretofore
valid interests.
II. PRESERVING CLAIMS
The provisions of the Act relating to the filing of statements
of claim are of immediate importance to the holders of old claims
who may desire to assert them at some future time. No claim
need be barred by the Act if timely compliance with its provisions
is made by the claimant. All the claimant need do to keep the
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claim alive as against a title otherwise marketable is to file a
proper statement of claim.
However, in some instances, the preparation of a proper
statement of claim can be time-consuming and burdensome. For
example, since the Act requires that the statement definitely
describe the real estate involved, it would seem that an accurate
and full legal description of all the land affected by the claim,
set forth in particular terms, should be made.
The statement of claim also must definitely describe the
nature and extent of the right or interest claimed and state the
facts upon which the right or interest is based. This requirement
implements the purpose of the Act to facilitate land transactions
because it enables a prospective purchaser to determine the
nature and extent of a claimant's interest without having'to
make a complete search of the ancient records affecting the title
to the property in question. At the same time, it provides an
arduous task for the claimant who has a volume of claims he
wishes to preserve. In addition to the above, a final requirement
is that the statement of claim be verified.
Furthermore, the statement of claim will be of no avail
unless it is filed within the applicable time limit prescribed by
the Act. When the Act becomes fully operative, the time limit
will invariably expire forty years after the claim to be preserved
arose. However, since the Act applies not only to interests which
may arise in the future but also to interests that are already forty
years old, the legislature made provisions for periods of grace
extending the period for recording claims that were forty years
old when the Act was adopted on July 14, 1959, or that became
forty years old less than two years after the effective date of the
Act.
Since the period of grace applying to claims that were more
than forty years old at the time the Act became effective has al-
ready expired, such claims can no longer be preserved. Unless
statements were filed for such claims prior to July 14, 1961,
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actions upon such claims are barred and the claims are effectively
extinguished. However, the period of grace applicable to claims
expiring less than two years after the effective date of the Act has
only expired with respect to some claims, and will continue to
be applicable to some claims until the Act becomes fully operative
on July 14, 1963. With respect to these claims, the Act provides
that if the forty year period expires less than two years after
the effective date of the Act, such period is extended for an addi-
tional two years from the date of expiration.
The Act provides that the statement of claim is to be filed
in the office of the Recorder of Deeds in the county where the
real estate affected is located. Ordinarily, it should be filed by
the claimant, his attorney, or his agent, However, in the case of
a claimant who is a minor or who is under legal disability, the
statement may be filed by his guardian, conservator, trustee,
either parent, or any person acting on his behalf. And, in the
case of a claimant who is unborn or unascertained, the statement
may be filed by any person acting on his behalf.
Unfortunately, the Act does not state the period for which
the statement of claim is effective. There can be little doubt that
the statement will preserve the claim for a forty year period and,
perhaps, because of the absence of provision to the contrary, it
will preserve the claim indefinitely. 8 However, by reason of the
provision that the Act shall be liberally construed to effect the
legislative purpose, it may be that it will be construed to pre-
serve the claim only for a forty year period. If the claim is
preserved only for a forty year period, the Act would probably
be construed to contemplate renewals because the preservation
of claims beyond a forty year period might be necessary in order
to satisfy constitutional requirements. 9
8 Professor Basye believes that the timely filing of notice will preserve a claim in-
definitely under the Act and that it will therefore ultimately be necessary to search back
for periods in excess of forty years in order to determine whether there are old claims
which have been preserved. He thinks that it would be preferable to require re-
recordings of notices during each forty year interval in order to limit periods of search.
See Basye, op. cit. supra note 1, § 173 at 78-9 (Supp. 1960).
9 Recent Statute, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 888 (1942).
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In some instances, a claim could be preserved without filing
the statutory statement of claim in the manner above described.
For example, if the claimant's cause of action has accrued, he
can bring suit within the forty year period. And, if the claimant
is in adverse possession of the real estate involved, his claim will
not be extinguished by the Act, even though he neither files a
statement nor brings an action. His adverse possession will pro-
vide ample evidence of his claim. Also, if the premises in question
are in the adverse possession of someone other than either the
claimant or the holder of forty year record chain of title, the
latter will not be able to bar an action by the claimant.
Since the indexing of statements of claim is the responsibility
of the recorder of deeds rather than the responsibility of the
claimant, the method of indexing is of little interest to the
claimant. It is of interest to a title examiner searching the title
on behalf of a prospective purchaser or mortgagee, however. The
Act provides that the claim shall be recorded and indexed in the
manner provided by law.
In counties where the recorder is not required to keep a
tract index, the Act further provides that he shall index claims
in an index labelled "Claimant's Book" and it prescribes the
manner in which this shall be done. In addition to indexing the
claim under the name of the person filing the claim, the recorder
is required to index it under the name of the person against
whom the claim is filed. Fortunately the Act has been amended to
make this latter requirement applicable only if the person against
whom the claim is filed is named in the claim. Otherwise, the
Act might have been construed as requiring the claimant to
name the person against whom the claim was filed in the state-
ment of claim and, under this construction, a title examination
would have been necessary in order to prepare a proper state-
ment of claim. If the volume of claims filed were not large,10
it might not be difficult to identify the claims affecting particular
10 In other jurisdictions with marketable title acts which have been in effect for
many years, comparatively few statements of claim have been filed. Simes, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 47.
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premises in a "Claimant's Book" because, after indexing the
claim under the proper name, the recorder is required to include
the document number of the claim (or the book and page where-
in the same is recorded) and a description of the real estate
involved.
III. AGAINST WHOM BARRED
The bar of the Act against actions at law or in equity based
on old interests, which have not been preserved by the filing of
a statement of claim, can be invoked only by the holder of a
chain of title who with his grantors, immediate or remote, must
be shown by the record to have held chain of title for at least
forty years before the action was commenced. In addition, the
real estate must not be in the adverse possession of another.
The operation of the Act is limited by its requirements with
regard to the title a person who seeks to invoke it must have.
The requirement of record title can be satisfied by records other
than by the records of the recorder's office only, such as the
records of the probate and chancery courts. The forty year period
for which record title must be shown is measured back from
the time a claimant commences his action. The chain of title
which must be shown for that period is a connected chain of
title which is unbroken."
The Act expressly enumerates several ways in which the
requirement of a connected chain can be satisfied. It can be
satisfied by conveyance from one who held title of record at the
time of the conveyance. Title by will or descent from any person
who held the title of record at the date of his death also satisfies
this requirement. Also, title by decree or order of any court, or
by deed issued pursuant thereto, meets this requirement of a
connected chain. Thus trustee's, trustee's in bankruptcy, con-
11 In Simes and Taylor, Model Title Standards, 25 (1960) it is stated that, "'An
unbroken chain of title of record,' within the meaning of the Model Marketable Title
Act may consist of (1) a single conveyance or other title transaction which purports to
create an interest and which has been a matter of public record for at least forty years;
or (2) a connected series of conveyances or other title transactions of public record in
which the root of title has been a matter of public record for at least forty years."
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servator's, guardian's, executor's, administrator's, receiver's, as-
signee's, master's in chancery, and sheriff's deeds are transfers
which are included in deiermining the record chain of title.
The Act is silent with respect to whether a record chain of
title must be based on a particular root of title. Although the
Act has not been construed by the courts of Illinois yet, this
problem has been considered in the construction of marketable
title acts by the courts of other states. In the case of Wichelman
v. Messner,12 the Supreme Court of Minnesota said that the title
benefited by the Minnesota Marketable Title Act is a fee simple
absolute or fee simple determinable or on condition subsequent.
It further said that the title benefited may not be founded upon
a stray, accidental or interloping conveyance because the statute
does not operate to provide a foundation for a new title. Finally,
the court noted that a law review article interpreted the term
"record title" in the Iowa Marketable Title Act to mean fee simple
title.'l
The root of title problem was also considered by the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska in the case of Smith v. Berberich.1
4
Therein, the heirs of a person whose title to certain real estate
was founded upon a quit claim deed from one tenant in common
brought an action to quiet title against the heirs of another tenant
in common, contending that, since the quit claim deed had been
of record for more than twenty-two years and since they were in
possession, they had the entire title to the land by reason of the
Nebraska Marketable Title Act. The defendants appealed from
the judgment of the District Court and the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the plaintiffs could not invoke the aid
of the marketable title act to sustain a claim of title to an interest
in land more extensive than that which the instrument upon
which the claim was founded purported to create and that a quit
12 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
13 The article to which reference is made is Comment, 2 Drake L. Rev. 76, 81
(1953).
14 168 Neb. 142, 95 N.W.2d 325 (1959).
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claim deed does not purport to convey the premises but only any
present interest of the grantor therein. 5
The reasoning of the Wichelman and Smith cases cannot,
however, be accepted as settling the root of title problem in
Illinois. The Wichelman case is of limited value for this purpose
because the Minnesota act uses the term "source of title" in lieu
of the term "chain of title" which appears in the Illinois and
Iowa acts.1 6 And the comment of the Minnesota court with
respect to a fee simple source of title being required under the
Iowa act did not purport to be anything more than an expression
of opinion. Furthermore, the Smith case involved a rather special
situation because the plaintiff and defendants therein were tenants
in common.
The fact remains that, under the Act, it may be unnecessary
for the record chain of title to be based on full fee simple owner-
ship to enable the holder of title to invoke the bar of the Act.
17
Because of the Act's silence on this question it may be that it
will be construed to permit estates and interests other than fees
simple to be declared marketable and freed of old claims that
have not been preserved. The legislature has provided that the
Act shall be liberally construed and the courts may decide that
its purpose will be furthered by making it applicable to interests
in land less than a fee.
Even if the holder of title has a title that meets the require-
15 Professor Simes notes that the principal case only pertains to quit claim deeds
as roots of title. See Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 349. If this construction
is adopted in Illinois, it will provide a partial solution to the "wild deed" problem.
16 The Minnesota marketable title act was amended subsequent to the decision in
the Wichelman case. See Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 492, approved April 24, 1959. Professor
Simes states that the effect of this amendment is to make any recorded fee simple trans-
action a sufficient root of title for the chain of title contemplated by the act. See Simes
and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 339-40.
17 Professor Simes, in his discussion of problems and objectives in drafting market-
able title acts, states that such statutes are needed to clear titles to fees simple and
that their value would not be substantially impaired if they only operated to clear
titles to fees simple. He then goes on to say that the value of such acts would be im-
paired if they were limited to fees simple absolute because they should solve the
problem of how to transform a fee simple, which is shown by the record not to be
absolute, into a fee simple absolute. See Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 351.
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ments of the Act, he cannot invoke its bar if the property
is in the adverse possession of another. Two Minnesota cases shed
light upon what is meant by the term possession in the marketable
title acts. In the Wichelman case, the court rejected the conten-
tion that claimants with constructive possession, such as the
plaintiff and his grantors claimed, fall within the exception in
the Act relating to rights of persons in possession on the ground
that the exception requires that the possession be present, actual,
open, and exclusive and inconsistent with the title of the person
protected by the Minnesota act.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota also considered the pos-
session requirement in a different context in the case of B. W.
& Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastings.8 Therein, the record own-
er brought action against a claimant to title through adverse
possession perfected more than forty years before the Minnesota
Marketable Title Act became operative to determine adverse
claims, contending that the marketable title act barred the
defendant's claim since the defendant had not filed any notice of
claim. The District Court awarded judgment to the defendant
on the ground that the defendant had been in adverse possession
since 1876. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the marketable title act did not merely limit the time for
commencing an action but barred the right itself, and that
the evidence was insufficient to establish possession of the nature
required to avoid the conclusive presumption of the marketable
title act. The court decided that such possession must be present,
actual, open, and exclusive and must be inconsistent with the
title of the person who is protected by the act, and that it must
be continuous from the time the act would otherwise bar the
claim until the action is commenced.
Several Iowa decisions consider the possession problem
where a trust relationship exists. Although the Iowa Marketable
Title Act, like the Minnesota Marketable Title Act, requires that
the holder of title be in possession in order to invoke the bar
18 240 Minn. 44, 59 N.W.2d 813 (1953).
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of the act, whereas the Illinois Act merely requires that the
property not be in the adverse possession of another, there is
good reason to believe that the Illinois courts will follow the rea-
soning of the Iowa cases.' 9 In the case of Boehnke v. Roenfanz,
cestuis que trust sued the trustee in possession to establish their
interests in realty. The trustee appealed from the decree of the
District Court for the plaintiffs contending that their rights were
barred by the Iowa Marketable Title Act. The Supreme Court of
Iowa affirmed the decision of the District Court holding that
statutes of limitation have no application as between the trustee
and cestuis of an express trust, that possession by the trustee of
trust property is in law possession of the cestuis, and that there
had not been a sufficient repudiation of the trust by the trustee to
make these rules inoperative.
The Boehnke decision was followed in the case of Pap v.
Pap.21 Therein, the residuary beneficiaries under the will of a
grantor sued his grantee to establish a trust relationship in the
real estate conveyed. The defendant appealed from the decree
of the District Court finding a trust by implication, contending
that the action was barred by the Iowa Marketable Title Act. The
Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision of the District
Court, holding that the possession of a trustee is for the benefit
of the cestuis and cannot be adverse thereto until the trustee
repudiates the trust. Rorem v. Rorem22 is an earlier decision
which also deals with the trust relationship as it relates to
possession. Therein, a son brought suit against the executors of
his father's estate to obtain title to real estate. The son appealed
from the decision of the District Court dismissing his petition.
The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision of the District
Court, holding that the son had failed to establish the trust
relationship which would make the marketable title act applica-
ble.
19 Because the possession by the trustee of trust property is in law possession of the
cestuis, that possession is adverse to the trustee's claim of individual title.
20 246 Iowa 240, 67 N.W.2d 585 (1954).
21 247 Iowa 371, 73 N.W.2d 742 (1955).
22 244 Iowa 980, 59 N.W.2d 210 (1953).
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The meaning of adverse possession should also be specially
considered where the premises in question are in the possession
of one tenant in common or one joint tenant. Unfortunately,
the decision in the Smith case did not rest on the matter of
possession and therefor is of little help. It may be assumed,
however, that the occupation of one tenant in common or one
joint tenant will not generally be regarded as hostile to the
others.
Although the Iowa Marketable Title Act was carefully con-
sidered at the time the Act was drafted in Illinois, the Illinois
Act differs from the Iowa one in that the former merely requires
that the property not be in the adverse possession of another
whereas the latter requires the person invoking the act to be in
possession. The possession requirement of the Iowa act was a
critical factor in the recent case of Todd v. Todd. Therein,
the surviving partners sued the devisees of the deceased partner
for partition, contending that the decedent merely held title for
the partnership. The surviving partners appealed from the
decision of the District Court holding that they had no interest
in the property. On rehearing, the Supreme Court of Iowa with-
drew its former opinion and reversed the judgment of the
District Court. In so doing, it held that the surviving partners
were entitled to partition and that their rights were not barred
by the Iowa Marketable Title Act because from the time the
property was purchased it was farmed by the partners and in
the possession of the partnership, until the death of the deceased
partner, and by the surviving partners since his death.
The principal advantage of the Illinois adverse possession
provision is that it enables the bar of the Act to be applied in
cases involving vacant land whereas the holder of title could never
apply the bar of the act in Iowa unless he had possession. The
adverse possession provision thus extends the applicability of
the Act. But under the negative requirement of "no one in
hostile possession" as well as under the affirmative requirement
23 250 Iowa 1084, 96 N.W.2d 436 (1959).
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of possession, a squatter might be able to prevent the record
owner from getting marketable title. It has been suggested that
it would therefore be better to require neither possession nor
the absence of hostile possession, but to provide that the record
owner gets marketable title subject to the rights of anyone arising
from a period of adverse possession. 4
Assuming that the holder of title is able to meet the chain
of title requirement and also the "no one in hostile possession"
requirement, the question arises of whether actual knowledge
of the existence of the claim would prevent him from invoking
the bar of the Act. Although the Act is silent on this, it appears
that a holder of title with actual or constructive knowledge of a
stale claim is not prejudiced thereby. This construction appears
necessary to attain the purpose of the Act, especially since it
contains no requirement that one must be a bona fide purchaser
in order to assert its bar.
25
Furthermore, in the case of United Parking Stations, Inc.
v. Calvary Temple,26 the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in effect,
concluded that actual knowledge was immaterial under the
Minnesota Marketable Title Act. Therein, a lessee, which claimed
the benefit of an easement reserved in a deed by a remote grantor
of the lessor, sued the holder of a contract for deed to the servient
tenement made subject to the easement, to enjoin obstruction
of it. The District Court found for the defendant, holding that
the easement had been lost by abandonment. On appeal, in
24 Jossman, The Forty Year Marketable Title Act: A Reappraisal, 37 U. Det. L.J.
422, 429 (1960).
25 Stebbins, Significance of Chapter 293, Laws of 1941, in Connection With Examina-
tion of Titles to Real Property, 15 Wis. S.B.A. Bull. 93 (1942); Tulane and Axley, Title
to Real Property-Thirty Year Limitation Statute, 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 258.
The attitude of our Appellate Court on the subject of actual knowledge is explained
in relation to the Mortgage Limitations Act in McCarthy v. Lowenthal, 327 Il1. App.
166, 63 N.E2d 666 (1945). It appears that under section llb of this act a mortgage lien
may be enforceable against the mortgagor or persons liable on the mortgage by reason
of extension, part payment or assumption, but may turn out to be barred as to third
persons if no notice has been given to them by recording in the fashion required by
statute. Thus a distinction has been made between the original parties to the trans-
action and third persons. The possibility that the courts will make a similar distinction
under the Marketable Title Act seems remote, but it should not be overlooked.
26 257 Minn. 273, 101 N.W.2d 208 (1960).
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addition to disputing the fact of abandonment, the plaintiff
contended that the more-than-forty-year-old easement for which
no preserving notice had been filed fell within an exception to
the bar of the Minnesota Marketable Title Act for two reasons.
First, that by the terms of the reservation in the deed, the ease-
ment was to be used by the owners of the dominant and servient
tenements jointly and that the actual occupancy and use of the
defendant would therefore bring the easement within the ex-
ception to the marketable title act relating to easements manifest-
ed by actual occupancy and use. Second, that the easement was
revived by the reference made to it in the contract for deed. In
addition to affirming the judgment of the lower court, the
Supreme Court answered the contentions of the defendant relat-
ing to the marketable title act. It decided that there was nothing
joint in the use of the right-of-way because one party used it
as owner and the other party by virtue of the reservation. It
also decided that the reference to the easement in the contract for
deed to the servient tenement did not revive it.
IV. PERSONS BARRED
Having determined who can invoke the bar of the Act,
it is next necessary to determine against whom this bar can
be invoked. It appears from the purpose of the Act that it can
be invoked to bar the claim of anyone except the United States.
With reference to this one important exception, the Act provides
that it shall not be deemed to affect any right, title or interest
of the United States unless the Congress shall assent to its opera-
tion in that behalf. Since the Congress has not assented, the bar
of the Act cannot operate against actions founded upon instru-
ments showing title or liens of the federal government. Because
it is beyond the power of a state legislature to bar the claims
of the federal government, this exception was probably placed
in the Act to indicate that the legislature intends that the Act
shall apply to federal claims when and if the Congress assents.
The Act is broader than most statutes of limitation in that
its bar can be asserted against the State of Illinois. It expressly
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provides that the rule that the State of Illinois is not bound by
limitations shall not apply. It further provides that it shall serve
to bar any right, title, interest or lien which the State of Illinois
or any department, commission or political subdivision thereof
would otherwise have. The intention of the legislature is thus
made very clear and, in addition, the Act provides that it bars
claims asserted by governmental corporations, thus removing
any possible doubt that is was not intended to apply to municipal
corporations.
As would be expected, the Act is made applicable to private
corporations and to natural persons who are sui juris. The Act is
extraordinary, however, in that it makes its provisions applicable
to persons under disability. Thus, it expressly dispenses with the
previously existing privilege of incompetents and, minors to
commence actions after their disability ceases. The previously
existing privilege was founded on the belief that the social
interest in protecting persons under disability was of greater
importance than quieting titles. The Act changes this and, under
it, incompetents will lose their claims unless someone files a
statement in their behalf just as persons sui juris will lose their
claims if, through mischance or neglect, they fail to file proper
statements of claim.
Since the Act is also expressly made applicable to persons
not yet in being, statements must be filed on behalf of unascer-
tained owners of contingent future interests in order to prevent
their actions from being barred when they accrue. Finally, by
making the bar of the Act applicable to persons within or with-
out the state, the legislature removed another customary excep-
tion.
V. CLAIMS BARRED
As has been established, the bar of the Act can be invoked
against any claimant except the federal government. Next it is
necessary to consider against what claims the bar of the Act can
be invoked. The legislature provided that the Act bars an action
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upon any claim 27 arising or existing more than forty years before
the commencement of such action. By thus providing for a forty
year limitation period instead of a specific cut-off-date, the legis-
lature eliminated one disadvantage of the Iowa act which has
necessarily been periodically amended to move forward the cut-off
date.
The meaning of the statutory term "arising or existing" is
critical to a determination of what claims are barred. It has
been suggested that this term is ambiguous because, for example,
a contingent remainder created by a will could be said to arise
either at the time the will became effective or at the time the
life tenant died.2 The Illinois legislature, however, borrowed
this term from the pre-existing Iowa Marketable Title Act and,
fortunately, its meaning has been ascertained in Iowa. 9 The
Iowa courts construed the term "arising or existing" to mean
"originating" or "coming into being" rather than "accruing."
The first case in which the Supreme Court of Iowa was
called upon to construe the meaning of the term "arising or
existing" was the case of Lane v. Travelers Ins. of Hartford
Conn.30 Therein, the minor plaintiffs sued to re-establish their
interests in land as contingent remainderman, alleging that the
quiet title decree, by which their interests were divested, was
based upon fraudulent testimony. The defendant appealed from
the decree of the District Court granting the relief prayed for,
contending that the interests of the minor plaintiffs were barred
by the Iowa Marketable Title Act. The Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the District Court, holding that contingent inter-
ests arise when they originate or come into being rather than
when they accrue.
27 In his discussion of problems and objectives in drafting a marketable title act,
Professor Simes suggests that a marketable title act should be thought of as an all-
inclusive tool. Instead of spelling out the details of its application to every conceivable
interest and situation, the legislator should regard it as a frame of reference, with blanks
to be filled in by judicial decision. See Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 349.
28 Comment, 1957 U. Ill. L.F. 488, 491.
29 Comment, supra note 13, at 79.
30 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941).
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The Lane case thus establishes that, in Iowa, a claim arises
or exists at the time it comes into being rather than subsequently
when it accrues. Therefore, the bar of the Iowa act can be invoked
against an action on a claim even though the claim did not
become possessory and even though an action on the claim had
not accrued within the statutory period. Although the language
of the Minnesota Marketable Title Act differs, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota construed it to reach the same result in the
Wichelman case." It did so by expressly rejecting the contention
that the Minnesota Marketable Title Act merely protects titles
against adverse claims, and that the plaintiff's title was not pro-
tected because it did not become adverse until the School District
decided not to use the property for school purposes, on the
ground that this contention would frustrate the policy of the
Minnesota act of preventing ancient records from fettering
marketability.
Because the language of the Illinois act is the same as the
language of the Iowa act in this particular and because the
policy of the Illinois act is the same as the policy of the Minne-
sota act, one reasonably might expect that the term "arising or
existing" will be construed to mean "originating" or "coming
into being" by the Illinois courts. Should this be so, an action
on a claim can be barred even though the claim did not become
possessory and even though an action on the claim had not
accrued prior to the expiration of the forty year period provided
by the Act for the filing of statements of claim.
A further consideration is whether a claim "arises" or
"exists" by reason of a conveyance being made "subject to" the
interest claimed. It has been suggested that, under the language
of the Wisconsin Marketable Title Act, easements and restrictions
and other rights are not barred if a conveyance recorded within
the statutory period is made expressly "subject to" such ease-
ments or other rights. 2 However, it is doubtful whether this
31 Supra note 12. The facts of this case are set forth on page 801.
32 Tulane and Axley, supra note 25, at 275.
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construction will be adopted in Illinois. 33 The argument for
adopting such a construction would be that a forty year title
search would reveal the existence of the claim. However, the
Act provides that the existence of the claim must be revealed
by a statement of claim and that the statement must describe the
nature and extent of the claim and the facts upon which it is
based. It would seem that the legislature intended that this be
the exclusive method of preserving a claim and that it did not
regard other forms of notice as sufficient. In the light of the
policy of the Act. even the contention that a holder of title who
had taken title "subject to" an interest should be estopped to
invoke the bar of the Act is not likely to be adopted by the
courts of Illinois, particularly since actual knowledge appears to
be irrelevant insofar as the operation of the Act is concerned.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that if the term "arising
or existing" should be construed by our court to mean "orgina-
ting" or "coming into being," it could hardly be contended that
an interest originates or comes into being merely because a
conveyance is made subject to it.
The Act makes no distinctions between interests which have
been created in a formal manner by documents which have been
recorded and those which have been created under unrecorded
documents and by other methods. It therefore appears that the
Act applies to actions founded upon claims based on any instru-
ment, event, or transaction more than forty years old. Although
it has been suggested that it might be better to provide that the
date of recording controls for the purpose of determining the
time at which an interest arose,34 the Act does not now so provide.
In addition to determining the meaning of the term "arising
or existing," it is necessary to determine whether a claim must
be based on a separate source of title in order that it may be
barred. This question was resolved under the Minnesota Market-
able Title Act in the case of Wichelman v. Messner . Therein,
33 United Parking Stations, Inc. v. Calvary Temple, supra note 26, indicates that this
construction has been rejected in Minnesota.
34 Jossman, supra note 24, at 422.
35 Supra note 12.
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the grantee of the vested interest of the heirs of the grantor of
certain real property, who had conveyed it to the predecessor of
a School District in 1897, subject to the condition that the
premises should revert when they ceased to be used for school
purposes, brought this action against the School District and its
grantee subsequent to 1946 when the school on the property had
been abandoned and the premises conveyed to the defendant,
to determine adverse claims and to obtain possession. Although
the defendants contended that the interest of the plaintiffs was
conclusively presumed to be abandoned by reason of the failure
of the heirs of the original grantor to record notice of their
interest within the forty year period as required by the Minnesota
Marketable Title Act, the District Court held for the plaintiff.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Minne-
sota Marketable Title Act permits the record owner of a fee simple
to be relieved from the burdens and restrictions outstanding
against such fee where the fee title itself is predicated upon the
instrument which contains the right or condition to be ex-
tinguished.
Because the Illinois Act makes no distictions between claims
based on separate sources of title and claims based on the same
source of title, it seems probable that a claim may be barred in
Illinois, as in Minnesota, even though it is not based upon a
separate source of title.36 While the problem may not arise in
Illinois with respect to reverters and rights of re-entry by reason
of the Reverter Act, it may arise with respect to other interests
reserved or excepted in conveyances.
In Minnesota, it has been determined that a claim involving
a boundary line dispute will not be barred by the Minnesota
Marketable Title Act. This result was reached by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in the case of Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry.
Co. v. Ellsworth.37 Therein, a landowner whose land was bounded
36 If the claim appears in instruments in the chain of title preceding the root of
title and if it does not appear in the instrument constituting the root of title, it would
seem that it is even more certain that the claim will be barred.
37 237 Minn. 439, 54 N.W.2d 800 (1952). In commenting on this case, Professor Simes
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on the north by a quarter section line sued a landowner whose
land was bounded on the south by the same line to determine the
proper location of that boundary line. The District Court made
a determination of the boundary line in accordance with the
contention of the plaintiff and accordingly rendered judgment
for the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant contended that since
the plaintiff's title was founded on a deed recorded more than
forty years prior to the commencement of the action and since
the plaintiff had not filed any statutory notice, its claim was
barred under the Minnesota Marketable Title Act. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota affirmed, holding that the defendant could
not take advantage of the Minnesota act because he had a
source of title to his own land which had been of record for forty
years.
Although the Minnesota act uses the term "source of title"
whereas the Illinois act uses the term "chain of title," it would
seem that the reasoning of the Minnesota court could be applied
under the Illinois act. The Illinois court might find that the
defendant had no chain of title to the land south of the line as
determined by it and that the defendant therefore could not
invoke the bar of the Act. Consequently, it appears that the Act
will not operate to bar claims in boundary line disputes where
the location of a particular line is in issue.
The effectiveness of the Iowa Marketable Title Act in barring
claims based on irregularities in the chain of title was considered
by the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Tesdell v. Hanes .3
Therein, the vendor under a purchase agreement sued for a
judgment declaring that he had met the requirements of the
agreement relating to good and merchantable title notwithstand-
ing an irregularity in the chain of title prior to 1940. The vendee
appealed from the decision of the District Court granting the
noted that it was indicated that the act might apply in cases of clearly conflicting de.
scriptions. He then said that over-lapping property descriptions are merely a special
instance of conflicting chains of record title and that the application of marketable title
statutes to cases involving chains with conflict is awkward at best. See Simes and Taylor,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 337.
a8 248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957).
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judgment sought, contending that the Iowa Marketable Title
Act did not cure the irregularity in the chain of title. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, hold-
ing that the holder of record chain of title for the statutory
period who has filed the statutory affidavit of possession and
against whose property no claim has been filed has good and
merchantable title by reason of the Iowa Marketable Title Act,
notwithstanding an irregularity in the chain of title prior to
1940.
The Tesdell case establishes that the Iowa Marketable Title
Act has the effect of barring claims based upon irregularities in
the chain of title. Since the relevant provisions of the Illinois
Act are similar to those of the Iowa act, the Illinois Act may well
be construed to have the same effect. Thus, irregularities in the
chain of title such as flaws in an old conveyance which make it
impossible to identify the ground described therein as corres-
ponding exactly with the ground now claimed under chain of
title or a variance in names which exceeds the limits of the
doctrine of idem sonons may be cured by the Act.
In addition to the general considerations discussed above,
it must be determined what specific claims will be barred by
the Act. The language of the Act with respect to this is broad
and sweeping. It provides that it may be invoked to bar any and
all interests of any nature whatsoever, however denominated.
This broad language is made subject to specific exemptions which
will be discussed later. At this time, specific claims that may be
barred will be considered.
The legislature expressly made the bar of the Act applicable
to both vested and contingent future interests. 9 In the Wichelman
case,"° the Supreme Court of Minnesota said that it would be
39 Professor Simes, in his discussion of problems and objectives of drafting market-
able title acts, states that future interests, such as rights of re-entry, possibilities of
reverter, and reversions and remainders subject to life estates should not be excepted
from the operation of forty-year statutes. He believes that as much consideration is
given to such interests as their social significance deserves by permitting them to be
preserved by the filing of notices. See Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 357.
40 Supra note 12.
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unreasonable and inconsistent with the purpose of the Minnesota
act to include within the meaning of the word "title," the life
estate, and thus compel the reversioner or remainderman to file
the statutory notice or be barred. The court recognized, however,
that the Iowa act will bar interests of contingent remaindermen
following a life estate and cited the Lane case 4 to that effect.
Thus, in addition to the express language of the Act, the con-
struction given the Iowa act, after which the Illinois act was to a
large extent patterned, leaves little room for doubt that rever-
sioners and remaindermen will be barred if they do not file the
requisite statement of claim providing there is a chain of title
running from the life tenant.
Furthermore, since it is probable that the Illinois courts
may follow the Iowa construction of the term "arising or exist-
ing," the Act may bar future interests upon which a cause of
action has not yet accrued prior to the expiration of the forty
year filing period or which, having accrued, have not yet become
barred by the expiration of the period allowed by other limita-
tion statutes, particular notice being taken of the extended terms
of limitation provided for minors and insane persons. Also,
since the Act probably cannot be construed to require the person
invoking its bar to have a separate source of title, it can be
invoked to bar reverters and rights of entry.
The Act expressly provides that actions based on equitable
interests as well as legal interests may be barred. Therefore, in
the case of property held in trust, the failure of the trustee to
file a claim might result in the effective extinguishment of the
beneficial interest as well as the legal interest of the trustee. The
bar of the Act also could be applied to other equitable interests
such as charges created by will.
Even though the court refused to apply the bar of the Iowa
act to a charge created by will in the case of Lytle v. Guilliams,
4 2
it clearly indicated that such interests could be barred, under the
41 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941).
42 241 Iowa 523, 41 N.W.2d 668 (1950).
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proper circumstances, by the Iowa act. In that case, the successors
of legatees whose interests were charged against devised property
sued to establish and foreclose the legacies. The defendants who
had possession and claimed record chain of title by reason of a
sheriff's deed issued after the foreclosure of a mortgage executed
by the life tenant and the remainderman whose interest was subject
to the charges, appealed from the judgment of the District Court
granting the relief prayed for, contending that the interests of the
plaintiffs were barred by the Iowa Marketable Title Act. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, hold-
ing that only those who have a title which complies with the con-
ditions of the statute are qualified to invoke its aid and that the
defendants did not have such title because the legatees whose
interests were charged against the property did not join in the
execution of the mortgage. Because the Illinois act provides that
it is applicable to equitable interests, there appears to be little
doubt that the Illinois courts, like the Iowa courts, would, under
the proper circumstances, make its bar applicable to charges
against devised property.
Because certain mortgages are expressly exempted from the
operation of the Act, it would seem that all other mortgages
and trust deeds will be held to be interests in real property
subject to the bar of the Act. It further seems that the bar of
the Act will also effectively extinguish other liens that endure
more than forty years such as the liens of real property taxes and
special assessments.
Since no exception is made in favor of dower, it would
seem that the Act also will bar dower interests. Thus, if a
married man acquired title to property and also conveyed it
without his wife's signature more than forty years prior to his
death, the widow's dower interest would be barred. In this
example, the widow's dower would be barred while it was still
inchoate on the ground that it arose at the time her husband
acquired his title and on the ground that he had acquired his
title more than forty years previously. If the dower interest had
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become consummate, this would not prevent it from being
barred, unless the courts construe the election of a widow to take
dower as giving rise to a new interest. Even if the courts arrive
at this construction, it would seem that a dower interest could
be barred after it has become consummate for a period of forty
years.
Numerous other interests will be within the bar of the
statute. Easements, profits, covenants and restrictions, except to
the extent that they are exempted from the operation of the
statute as will later be noted, are also subject to its bar. There-
fore, a claimant who may want to assert any of these interests
at some future time should protect his right to do so by comply-
ing with the statutory filing procedure within the forty year
period.
VI. EXEMPT CLAIMS
As was suggested in the discussion of what claims may be
barred by the Act, it is not absolute so as to bar actions on all
interests. The legislature exempted numerous claims from the
bar of the Act. These exemptions protect certain interests that
might otherwise have been barred and relieve the holders of
these interests of the necessity of filing statements of claim in
order to preserve them. At the same time, these exemptions make
it impossible for a purchaser or a mortgagee to rely on a forty
year chain of title.
The Act expressly exempts any easement or interest in
the nature of an easement, the existence of which such easement
or interest either is apparent from or can be proved by physical
evidences of its use. This exemption, like the "no one in hostile
possession" requirement already discussed, protects possession.
Perhaps it was included on the theory that interests like these
were more likely to be overlooked because of the fact that the
owner of the right is not so actively concerned with it.13 Perhaps
the legislature included it in order to spare the owners of mul-
titudinous easements, such as public utilities, the burdensome
43 Tulane and Axley, supra note 25, at 265.
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task of filing statements of claim for every parcel of land over
which they are used.4
In addition to exempting such easements and interests in the
nature of an easement, the legislature exempted any rights
granted, reserved, or excepted by any instrument creating such
easements or interests. This additional exemption averts the
problem which otherwise might arise where the use of only a
part of an easement granted is apparent. In the absence of this
provision, perhaps the Act might have been construed only to
preserve that part of the easement the use of which is apparent.
Also, it might have been construed so as to extinguish collateral
rights, such as the right to trim shrubs that interfere with the
use of the easement.
The legislature also provided that such easements are exempt
whether or not physical evidences of their use are visible from
the surface. This avoids a problem of construction that might
arise, for example, with respect to underground pipelines. In
the absence of this provision, owners of such interests would have
been in doubt as to whether they, like the owners of similar surface
interests, were exempted from the duty to file statements in order
to preserve their rights.
While the meaning of the term "easement" is clear, it must
be determined what the term "interest in the nature of an ease-
ment" is intended to include. It might be contended that this
terminology would include covenants and restrictions affecting
the use of land. For example, a building line restriction might
be regarded as an easement of air, light and v iew. Then, if there
are sufficient existing violations so that the building line cannot
be proved by physical evidences of its use, an action to enjoin
a further violation could be barred if a statement of claim had
not been filed.
45
The Act also exempts any interest created or held for any
44 Aigler, Marketable Title Acts, 13 U. Miami L. Rev. 47 (1958).
45 For a discussion of the effect of marketable title acts on easements and equitable
servitudes see Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 224-29.
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public utility purpose from the filing requirement. This exemp-
tion, which was added to the original Act by amendment, altered
the intent of the Act because its effect is to remove the require-
ment of filing claims as to unused recorded easements more than
forty years old. It preserves utility easements some of which may
never be used again. However, many of the presently unused inter-
ests preserved by this clause may be used in the future. In fact, such
interests may have been acquired in anticipation of a future
need that has not yet materialized. For example, it is possible that
provisions made for public utility easements at the time property
is subdivided will not result in the construction of public utility
facilities until more than forty years thereafter when the proper-
ty is developed. If the Act had the effect of extinguishing the
easements, the result might be delay and unnecessary expense
in providing necessary services for the community.
Another exemption provides that the Act shall not validate
any encroachment on any street, highway or public waters. By
so providing, the legislature recognized that the public interest
in streets, highways, and public waters outweighs the public
interest in promoting the marketability of land titles.46 This
provision was necessary because the Act otherwise applies to
interests of the State.
The clause exempting any separate mineral estate from
the filing requirement of the Act was added by amendment
because coal companies were fearful that the Act otherwise might
be construed to place the owners of mineral titles in the category
of claimants. It is unlikely that such a construction would have
been adopted. In fact, in the Wichelman case,47 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota said that the owner of a mineral estate does
not have to file a statutory notice because he has a separate
freehold estate of inheritance from the surface estate. And the
Supreme Court of Illinois held in the case of Uphoff v. Trustees
46 Professor Simes believes that the exception of governmental interests from the
operation of marketable title acts is undesirable. See Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 357.
47 Supra note 12.
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of Tufts College,48 that a mineral title is a separate and distinct
estate and that non-user of the mineral interest does not terminate
the estate. In any event, there is now no doubt that mineral
estates are exempt.
Any rights, immunities and interests appurtenant or relating
to separate mineral estates are also expressly exempted. Perhaps
the principal reason for this clause is that, when a mineral estate
is acquired, it is customary to acquire additional rights to mine
and remove coal which are a charge against the surface estate.
It can be contended that, in the absence of this clause, such
additional rights could be prejudiced by conveyances from sur-
face owners not containing the appropriate exceptions.
It is also provided that no statement recorded or action filed
pursuant to the provisions of the Act shall affect real estate
registered under "An Act concerning land titles." And the
further provision that real estate heretofore or hereafter register-
ed under "An Act concerning land titles," shall be subject to
the terms thereof and all subsequent amendments thereto leaves
no doubt that property registered under the Torrens system is
not subject to the Act. This exemption was probably made be-
cause the Act is designed to improve the recording system, and
the Torrens system therefore was regarded as beyond its scope.
The Act also contains express exemptions relating to lease-
hold estates. It provides that it shall not operate to deprive any
lessor or his successor as reversioner of his right to possession on
the expiration of any lease. 49 And it further provides that it
shall not operate to deprive any lessee or his successor of his
rights in and to any lease. These exemptions were probably in-
cluded because long term leases are seldom inconsequential
interests or stale claims and their inclusion therefore would
have done more harm than good.
48 351 Ill. 146, 184 N.E. 213 (1932).
49 Professor Simes concedes that an argument in favor of including this exception
in marketable title acts can be made, because lessors who are out of possession might
reasonably overlook the requirement of notice, but he believes it to be of little practical
importance. See Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 357.
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An exemption is also made in favor of any interest of a
mortgage or interest in the nature of that of a mortgage, 50 where
the due date of the mortgage is stated on the face, or ascertain-
able from the written terms thereof and is not barred by section
1 lb of "An Act in regard to limitations." This exemption will
be particularly helpful where long term mortgagees with general
descriptions are involved since, under these circumstances, it
would be particularly difficult to prepare proper statements of
claim. Therefore, when such mortgages are being drafted, care
should be taken to qualify them for this exemption and old
mortgages should be reviewed to ascertain whether they qualify.
If they do not, statements of claim must be filed to prevent them
from being extinguished.
Although, in the Wichelman case, 51 the Supreme Court of
Minnesota said that recorded mortgages securing monetary obli-
gations over a term of at least forty years which the fee owner has
assumed or taken "subject to," are exempt from the require-
ment of filing notice if there is a current active relationship
with the fee owner, it added that it is desirable to file notice in
order to avoid the problem of proving the fact of a sufficiently
active relationship. Under the Illinois act, there is no reason
to believe that "a sufficiently active relationship" would prevent
a mortgage from being barred. A statement of claim therefore,
should be filed whenever the due date is not ascertainable from
a reading of the mortgage.
As has already been noted, the holder of title cannot invoke
the bar of the Act if the premises in question are in the adverse
possession of the claimant or some third party.52 Thus adverse
possession at the time the action is brought may exempt some
claims and this adverse possession apparently need not be con-
tinuous.5
3
50 Professor Simes believes that mortgages should not be excluded from the opera-
tion of marketable title acts. See Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 357.
51 Supra note 12.
52 The Act could be invoked to bar a claim to title based on adverse possession
which was perfected more than forty years before and it could possibly bar such a
claim which had partially accrued prior to the forty year period.
53 Professor Simes, in his discussion of problems and objectives in drafting a mar-
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Finally, the Act will not bar actions to enforce rights,
claims, interests, encumbrances, or liens founded upon any event,
instrument, or transaction executed or occuring within forty
years prior to the commencement of the action. Nor will it bar
actions where the plaintiff has filed a proper statement of claim
within forty years.
The specific exemptions provided by the Act merely serve
to emphasize its widespread applicability and the importance of
complying with its requirements in order to preserve claims.
While good reasons exist for most of these exemptions, at the
same time, they detract from the purpose of the Act by making
it impossible to rely upon a title search limited to the compara-
tively recent record. Because they detract from the purpose of
Act, it is reasonable to assume that they will not be liberally
construed and the claimant should therefore file a preserving
statement unless he is certain that it falls within one of them.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
Having considered how the Act operates, it remains to be
considered whether there are any constitutional barriers which
will prevent the Act from being upheld by the courts as a valid
exercise of the police power.54 It has already been established
that marketable title acts are more than statutes of limitation in
substance. The constitutionality of this new type of legislation in
Illinois, therefore, cannot be predicted with certainty.
It might be contended that the Act should be declared void
on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition
against depriving persons of property without due process of
law. The contention that the Minnesota Marketable Title Act
ketable title act, states that it is better for the destructive effect of the statute to be
absolute so that a claim cannot be revived by a mere change in possession once it
has been extinguished. The alternative is for the destructive effect of the statute to be
relative so that claims which have been extinguished may become valid by a shift in
possession. See Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 352.
54 If the constitutional validity of the Act is upheld, it will be upheld on the ground
that its requirements are a legitimate exercise of the police power. See Nelson, Con-
veyancing in New York, 43 Cornell L. Rev. 617, 635 (1958).
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retroactively bars vested rights, and therefore, violates the due
process provisions of the Minnesota and federal constitutions,
was made in the Wichelman case.55 The Supreme Court of
Minnesota, however, rejected this contention, saying that no one
has a vested right in any particular remedy and that the legisla-
ture may change or modify the existing remedies for the enforce-
ment and protection of vested rights in property, as long as an
adequate remedy remains.
The answer of the Minnesota Supreme Court goes a long
way toward resolving the due process problem under the Illinois
act for the reason that it, like the Minnesota act, does not auto-
matically terminate interests already in existence unless the claim-
ant fails to comply with the filing requirement. No cause of
action can be barred by the Act unless the filing requirement is
not observed. Whether the Act complies with the requirements
of due process would therefore seem to hinge upon the reasonable-
ness of the requirement that a statement of claim be filed.
In the Wichelman case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
was also confronted with the contention that the application of
the Minnesota act as between parties to the same instrument could
produce consequences in violation of the contract provisions of
the Minnesota and federal constitutions. It rejected this argu-
ment for the same reason that it rejected the due process argument.
In Illinois, as in Minnesota, the legislature may change or modify
the existing remedies for the enforcement and protection of con-
tract rights as long as an adequate remedy remains. If the filing
requirement may be regarded as reasonable, it should follow that
a claimant will never be deprived of an adequate remedy by the
Illinois act.
If the filing requirement were held to be unreasonable, it
would be necessary for the Illinois courts to decide whether the
Act, by terminating property interests, did violate due process
and impair the obligation of contracts, in which case, the Act
55 Supra note 12.
ILLINOIS MARKETABLE TITLE ACT
might be held voidA6 Even then, however, efforts would probably
be made to sustain its validity by citing cases in which statutes
terminating property interests have been upheld. The case of
Livingston v. Meyers,5 7 in which the Supreme Court of Illinois
upheld the Mortgage Limitation Act, would be cited. It might
be persuasive upon the court because the Mortgage Limitation Act
has the effect of extinguishing vested rights.
Other cases which might be cited in an effort to uphold the,
validity of the Act, if the contingency under consideration oc-
curred, would include Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf,55 in which
the validity of a statute limiting the duration of possibilities of
reverter and rights of re-entry was upheld; Jennings v. Capen, 9
in which a statute terminating the right of a life tenant and re-
mainderman to destroy contingent remainders was upheld; Prall
v. Burckhartt,60 in which a statute terminating the possibility of
reverter to land for streets was upheld; and McNeer v. McNeer,6 '
in which a statute abolishing the estate of curtesy was upheld.
62
None of the statutes upheld by these cases are as broad in scope
as the Act. However, since it is improbable that the filing require-
ment will be found to be unreasonable, it seems useless to explore
further the consequences of a contingency that probably will not
occur.
The requirement that a preserving statement be filed is not
merely an alternative to the bringing of an action because, under
the Act, it may be necessary to file a statement of claim to preserve
a cause of action before it accrues. Statutes of limitation limit
the time for bringing an action after the cause of action has ac-
crued. Therefore, the reasonableness of the filing requirement
of the Act cannot be completely measured by comparing it to the
requirements of statutes of limitation. It would seem, however,
56 Scurlock, op. cit. supra note 4, at 82.
57 6 Ill.2d 325, 129 N.E.2d 12 (1955).
58 6 Ill.2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955).
59 321 Ill. 291, 151 N.E. 900 (1926).
60 299 Il. 19, 132 N.E. 280 (1921).
61 142 Ill. 388, 32 N.E. 681 (1892).
62 These cases are considered in Comment, supra note 28, at 493.
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that the filing requirement is comparable to the requirements of
existing recording laws6 3 and that, since it serves an important
public purpose, it will not be found to be unreasonable."
The reasonableness of the filing requirement cannot be
doubted when it is compared with the requirements of both
recording statutes and limitation statutes. The Act imposes a
lesser burden on landowners than did the recording laws because
it only applies to those who claim interests of ancient origin.65 At
the same time, it promotes the public welfare by assuring more
secure land transactions, just as the recording acts have done.
Also, the Act imposes a lesser burden than a statute of limitation
because it offers the filing of a statement of claim as an alternative
to the bringing of an action in cases where the cause of action has
accrued. Furthermore, the Act will never have the effect of shorten-
ing existing limitations when a proper statement of claim is
recorded.
Even though the Act is retrospective in that it applies to
claims that have existed for many years, it operates prospectively
in that it provides ample time for the filing of statements based
on such claims. The periods of grace provided by the Act give
persons with claims already in existence ample time within which
to assert such claims. Statutes of limitation which shorten the
period for bringing an action are upheld if they give the holder
of a claim a reasonable time in which to assert and preserve his
rights.66 The Act, like valid statutes of limitation, provides for this.
Perhaps, the only other basis on which the reasonableness of
the filing requirement could be questioned is that no provision is
made for the renewal of preserving statements. It has been sug-
gested that provision for successive renewal by periodic re-record-
63 Simes, op. cit. supra note 3, at 47.
64 Scurlock, op. cit. supra note 4, at 82-3, 227-31.
65 Haines, Marketable Title Acts-A Means to Improve Title Practice, 30 Dicta
423, 428 (1953).
66 The United States Supreme Court upheld a statute that required claimants with
existing causes of action to sue within nine months and seventeen days in the case of
Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877). The cases of Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911)
and McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890) hold that a one year period of grace is
sufficient as to rights already in existence.
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ing is necessary in order to meet the requirements of due process.67
Unfortunately, the Act does not indicate whether such renewals
are contemplated. In fact, the Act does not even state whether a
statement filed will remain effective for a period of forty years.
However, if the Act is construed so that the filing of a statement
will preserve a claim indefinitely, no objection founded upon the
due process clause can be maintained. In view of the silence of the
Act on this question, this appears to be the probable construction.
In addition to the due process objection, there remains to be
considered other grounds upon which the validity of the Act may
be questioned. The validity of the Minnesota Marketable Title
Act was challenged in the Wichelman case. 68 with the contention
that the exceptions are so arbitrary and discriminatory as to con-
stitute class or special legislation forbidden by the Minnesota
constitution. The Supreme Court of Minnesota disposed of this
contention by saying that there was nothing to indicate that the
legislature acted arbitrarily in classifying the exceptions so that
persons similarly situated were arbitrarily treated differently or
that the legislature abused its authority.
The same challenge could be made under the Illinois consti-
tution, but it is likely that the Illinois courts will arrive at the same
answer. Even though the amendment, exempting interests created
or held for public utility purposes, changed the original intent
of the Act by permitting certain unused easements more than
forty years old to endure without the filing of a claim, it would
seem that it did not go so far that it will be found to be arbitrary
and discriminatory. 69 Also, it would seem that none of the other
exemptions could be characterized as arbitrary or discriminatory.
Another possible ground upon which the validity of the
Act might be questioned is that, unlike most statutes of limita-
67 Recent Statute, supra note 9, at 888.
68 Supra note 12.
69 Marketable title acts of other states contain similar exceptions. See Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 26.1274 (1953); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.023 (Supp. 1961); S.D. Code § 51.16B11
(Supp. 1960); West's Wis. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 330.15 (1958). In addition N.D. Century
Code § 47-19A-11 (1960) excepts the right, title, or interest of any railroad.
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tion, its bar can be asserted against anyone except the United
States. This objection, however, is without merit. It is established
that the State of Illinois may constitutionally be barred of its
rights when a statute expressly so provides.70 The usual extended
limitation applicable to persons under disability is founded upon
a public policy established by statutes rather than upon a consti-
tutional mandate.
A final constitutional objection, and one which was argued in
the Wichelman case,7'1 is that the terminology of the Act is so
vague and ambiguous as to render it meaningless. In the Wichel-
man case, this argument was directed at the term "claim of title
based on a source of title," and the Supreme Court of Minnesota
rejected it on the ground that it was able to define the purpose
and intent of the legislature and to construe the Minnesota act
in a reasonable manner to support and give effect to that purpose
and intent. If this same objection is made in Illinois with respect
to the term "chain of title" or the term "arising or existing," it is
likely that the Illinois courts will dispose of it as it was disposed
of in Minnesota. This result is more probable because these terms
appear in the Iowa Marketable Title Act, and they had been
construed by the Supreme Court of Iowa prior to the time that
the Illinois act became law.72
For the above reasons, it seems probable that the Supreme
Court of Illinois will uphold the constitutional validity of the
Act when it is called upon to do so. In other states, no marketable
title act with a filing requirement similar to that of the Illinois
Act has been held unconstitutional and the Supreme Courts of
Iowa 73 and Minnesota7 4 have upheld the marketable title acts in
70 Note, 38 Ill. L. Rev. 418 (1944).
71 Supra note 12.
72 Furthermore, the Act enumerates circumstances under which a person will be
deemed to hold chain of title.
73 In Tesdell v. Hanes, supra note 38, the Supreme Court of Iowa indicated that
the Iowa act was enacted with ample legislative authority. Previously, in both Applesby
v. Farmers State Bank of Dows, 244 Iowa 288, 56 N.W.2d 917 (1953) and Swanson v. Pon-
tralo, 238 Iowa 693, 27 N.W.2d 21 (1947) the court referred to its statement in Lane v.
Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., supra note 41, to the effect that statutes giving
greater stability to record titles are desirable.
74 Wichelman v. Messner, supra note 12.
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those jurisdictions. The Kansas7 5 and Pennsylvania 71 statutes aimed
at barring stale claims were held unconstitutional because, unlike
the Illinois act, they required that suit be brought within a short
time even if the cause of action had not accrued.
VIII. EFFECT
Although the Act is broad in scope, there are many interests
which it will not affect. The operative portions of the Act affect
no interest that is not at least forty years old. Furthermore, the
Act expressly provides that it shall not extend the period for the
beginning of any action or the doing of any other required act
under any statutes of limitation. Therefore, claims that do not
endure for forty years, such as judgment liens, mechanics' liens,
and inheritance tax liens, cannot be affected by the operation of
the Act. Actions on many other types of claims will be barred by
statutes of limitation within less than forty years after they arise
assuming that they accrue within the first few decades after they
arise.
The Act has no effect whatever upon certain numerous in-
terests that are more than forty years old. Thus it can have no
effect upon the numerous interests that it expressly exempts. It
can have no effect upon claims of the United States, regardless of
their age, until such time as Congress assents. And no holder of
title can use the Act to bar a claim unless he has a forty year chain
of title. As a result, the Act does not enable reliance on a forty
year title search.
78
In addition, the Act protects the rights of persons in posses-
sion. The holder of title cannot bar any claim, regardless of its
age, if the land is in the adverse possession of the claimant or even
some third person. Although the Act will not bar actions on many
75 Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949).
76 Girard Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 364 Pa. 576, 73 A.2d 371 (1950).
77 Brodkey, Current Changes in Illinois Real Property Law, 10 DePaul L. Rev. 567,
575 (1961). Mr. Brodkey states that it is probable that the constitutionality of the Act
will be upheld.
78 Even though the Act does not make shorter title searches possible, it may sim-
plify the examining process because it will enable many instruments to be disregarded.
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claims even if an attempt is made by the holder of title to assert its
bar, it is more reliable than most statutes of limitation in that
it does not contain the usual exceptions in favor of persons under
disability, and in that the State of Illinois is expressly made sub-
ject to its provisions.
In the area in which the Act is operative, it will destroy
property interests. When its bar is asserted in actions upon claims
for which preserving statements have not been filed, it will have
the effect of extinguishing these interests as well as barring them.
Furthermore, since the Act's first and most important grace period
expired on July 14, 1961, its bar can already be asserted against
actions on numerous forty year old claims for which statements
have not been filed in the time allotted. As time goes on it will
continue to effectively extinguish more and more interests.
Although the Act will cause numerous claimants, especially
those whose claims have not accrued within the forty year period,
to lose their interests, it has many advantages. By modifying the
recording law to limit the time within which a recording has the
effect of notice to subsequent purchasers, the Act restores the effec-
tiveness of the recording system in facilitating transactions in land.
This modification of the recording system was necessary to preserve
the stability of record ownership which has been increasingly
threatened by the accumulation of stale claims which hamper
marketability. It was necessary for legislative action to clear land
titles of these stale claims in order to prevent them from becoming
an increasing barrier to marketability.
Since the Act has the effect of modifying the recording system
by limiting the time within which recording has the effect of
notice, a liberal construction of the provision that it shall not
affect the operation of any acts or case law governing the record-
ing or the failure to record any instruments affecting land is called
for. Any conflict here can easily be resolved for the reason that,
while the Act has the effect of modifying the recording system, it
actually operates merely to bar actions.
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While the Act appears to accomplish the legislative purpose
of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions, its operation
may result in some inequities. As previously suggested, it might
have been better to have a different requirement with respect to
possession so that a squatter could not prevent a record owner
from getting marketable title. However, in general, the Act serves
the important public purpose of promoting the marketability of
land titles in what appears to be an efficient and equitable way.
79
And the public purpose served by the Act off-sets the effect it has
of destroying aged interests if proper and timely statements of
claim are not filed.
79 Simes, op. cit. supra note 3, at 42.
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